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RUNNING COVENANTS AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 
Olin L. Browder* 
When first encountering covenants running with the land, 
one may react against the very idea. Why should any person be 
able to enforce a promise not made to him or be bound by a 
promise he did not make? Modern contract law, particularly the 
rules about the assignment of contract rights and the rights of 
third-party beneficiaries, may answer the first question, but does 
not explain how anyone can be bound by a promise neither ex-
pressly nor impliedly made or consented to by him. 
On the other hand, persons_ familiar with easements, liens, 
or mortgages understand that land ownership can be subject to 
and burdened by property interests in other persons, so that suc-
cessive owners are subject to burdens they did not create. That a 
landowner's promise may be similarly binding is not startling. 
Technically, a mere promise does not create an easement or a 
lien; but we all know of cases in which promissory language was 
held to create an easement. 
Under traditional concepts, a purely negative or restrictive 
promise is hardly distinguishable from a negative easement; both 
obligate a person not to do something. But an affirmative promise 
differs from an affirmative easement. An affirmative easement 
entitles its owner to do something to or on, or to make some 
limited use of, the servient owner's land, while an affirmative 
promise obligates the promisor to do something for the benefit of 
the promisee or his land. Yet unless it offends some policy, no 
reason exists why the concept of an easement could not be en-
larged to include interests which stem technically from promises, 
as the courts occasionally have held.1 The novelty of such an idea 
would not be thought today an objection unless an objection on 
the ground of novelty were merely a way of expressing some other 
less-easily defined policy. Whether there ever was such a policy 
or whether there should be now is one of the questions addressed 
by this Article. 
To explain the running of covenants by likening them to 
easements, we must initially ask how any interest in or burden 
* James V. Campbell Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1935, LL.B. 
1937, University of Illinois; S.J.D. 1941, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. E.g., Hottell v. Farmers' Protective Assn., 25 Colo. 67, 53 P. 327 (1898). 
12 
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upon land benefits or binds succe~sors of the original parties. At 
least in respect to covenants, the basic requirements, which are 
now accepted as almost Sl:lcrosanct, were expressed long ago in 
Spencer's Case:2 the covenanting parties must intend that the 
covenant run with the land, 3 and the covenant must "touch and 
concern" land. Whether these two requirements are or should be 
distinct, or merely demand the same thing in two ways, deserves 
attention in due course. If liens or mortgages rather than ease-
ments (or in addition to easements) are an analogy, why cannot 
the original parties to a covenant explicitly burden land in ways 
that would otherwise be purely personal? That is, can the parties 
cause burdens to touch and concern land merely by agreement? 
For the present, one can assert that the idea of being bound 
by a promise one has not made, instead of producing an instinc-
tive negative reaction, may in respect to promises that concern 
land in fact produce a reaction that takes such a result as a 
matter of course, if not of necessity. This idea, while not easily 
defined, may appear even to a layman as fundamental and not 
as merely technical or conceptual. It was expressed both in 
Spencer's Case, 4 involving relations between landlords and ten-
ants, and much later in Tulk v. Moxhay, 5 where the running of 
restrictive burdens was decreed in equity. It expresses a revulsion 
against permitting a person to contract for a burden respecting 
his land, only to have that burden disappear the l.llinute he trans-
fers his land to someone else. 
So far, we have been thinking about why covenants burden-
ing land should run in any case, that is, what considerations 
impel the conclusion that at least some covenants ought to run 
with land? On the other hand, one can ask, assuming that the 
usual ingredients are present, what factors should impel the con-
clusion that some covenants, in some circumstances, should not 
run? This question, of course, introduces considerations of public 
policy. Rarely, however, is that question put so simply and di-
rectly. One gets the impression from much of the existing doctrine 
that vague, undefined policies underlie the courts' formulation or 
application of rules that,are not asserted in policy terms. Al-
2. 5 Co. 16a, 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74 (Q.B. 1583). 
3. In fact, the court did not declare a rule of intention as such, but questioned 
whether an assignee is bound merely by being designated, that is, by a covenant that 
purports to bind the covenantor and his assigns. The court resolved that the assignee will 
not be bound even where named unless the covenant pertains to a thing "in esse." 77 Eng. 
Rep. at 74. 
4. 77 Eng. Rep. at 74. 
5. 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144 (Ch. 1848). 
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though at various times and places the running of benefits and 
of burdens have been treated identically, it now seems to be gen-
erally conceded that few policy considerations apply to the for-
mer. It is with the latter that this Article is primarily concerned. 
In proceeding with this purpose, it seems desirable to exam-
ine both English and American case law in search of declared or 
implied policy forces, with special emphasis on whether certain 
rules, if indeed they are rules of public policy, really serve any 
policy, and to conclude with an assessment of where today's 
courts ought to stand on the limits to running covenants. It will 
be seen, if one reads further, that he will be going over old ground 
and hearing old drums of criticism. But I will not be beating dead 
horses, for these old horses are still alive. I hope to avoid belabor-
ing such matters more than is necessary to serve my purpose, 
which is not to survey once more the law on covenants running 
with the land. 
In further limitation, very little will be done with that part 
of the subject dealing with the relations between landlord and 
tenant, and only to a limited extent with that largest part of the 
modern law, the rules relating to equitable servitudes, where the 
courts have pretty well spun themselves free of old impediments. 
If you wonder whether anything is left worth talking about, the 
stated purpose of this Article is the only answer, which if you are 
willing to persevere, will be elaborated further. 
THE ENGLISH LAW 
A distinguished company of scholars has explored with im-
pressive erudition and some disagreement the dim mists of medi-
eval English law for the origin of the running of covenants. 8 There 
is no reason here to attempt to shed any more light on that sub-
ject. Some legal scholars believe that running covenants sprang 
from early warranties (expressed or implied).7 It seems estab-
lished that the early covenants long anteceded the modern ele-
ments of contract law; running covenants are in essence, there-
fore, a part of the law of property, not an adaptation or extension 
of contract principles to property law. Professor Bordwell asserted 
6. C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTEREsTS WmcH "RUN WITH THE LANo" 92· 
143 (2d ed. 1947); 0. HoL?.IEB, Tm: COMMON LAw 371-409 (1881); H. S1Ms, COVENANTS 
WHICH RUN WITH LAND 45-57 (1901); Bordwell, The Running of Covenants-No Anomaly 
(pts. 1-2), 36 IowA L. REv. 1, 484 (1950-1951); Sims, The Law of Real Covenants: Excep-
tions to the Restatement of the Subject by the American Law Institute, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 
1 (1944). 
7. 0. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 371-409; H. S1MS, supra note 6, at 45-57. 
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that in contrast to the creation in equity of the "us.e," which was 
used at law in developing the doctrine of estates, "the idea that 
an obligation could be illlposed on or follow the land did not 
originate with equity but was the very heart of the feudal sys-
tem. "8 Bordwell put the question: "Was it [the running cove-
nant] a real contribution of the Middle Ages to the law compara-
ble to, but of much less importance than, the trust or the estate, 
or on the other hand, is it an outworn relic of feudalism to be kept 
within bounds?" His own reply: "The thesis of this article is that 
it was a real contribution and no anomaly."9 
Both Bordwell and Judge Clark contended that the early 
requirement of "privity of estate" for the running of covenants 
meant what we now call "vertical privity," that is, the relation 
between the original parties to a covenant and their respective 
successors rather than the relation between the covenanting par-
ties themselves. 10 In any case, most if not all scholars agree that 
prior to the nineteenth century the running of both benefits and 
burdens of covenants between owners in fee simple was taken for 
granted, if not judicially established. Any remaining doubt on the 
point probably results from the fact that the question of cove-
nants regarding fee estates did not often arise, for the early law 
was mainly concerned with the running of covenants between 
landlords and tenants, as reflected in 32 Henry VIII c.34 and in 
Spencer's Case. 11 
Lord Kenyon's statement in Webb v. Russell is the source of 
modern concern with privity of estate: "It is not sufficient that a 
covenant is concerning the land, but, in order to make it run with 
the land, there must be privity of estate between the covenanting 
parties."12 Unfortunately, he did not say why this was so, nor 
explain what he meant by privity. In fact, Professor Bordwell 
pointed out that Lord Kenyon abandoned his proposition a year 
later and rested the rule of Webb v. Russell upon another 
ground.13 It is therefore all the more remarkable that American 
courts have relied on Lord Kenyon's dictum more often than upon 
any of the later English cases that infused meaning into the priv-
ity requirement. This is, of course, the familiar judicial device of 
relying on an ambiguous requirement to support a court's own 
8. Bordwell, supra note 6, at 9. 
9. Id. at 8. 
10. Id. at 488; C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 111. 
11. 5 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q. B. 1583). 
12. 3 T.R. 393, 100 Eng. Rep. 639, 644 (K.B. 1789). 
13. Bordwell, supra note 6, at 492 n.57. 
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meaning, although in this instance that is not the meaning later 
supplied by the English courts. 
A policy requirement was at length imposed upon the run-
ning of covenants in Keppell v. Bailey. 14 The court stated that the 
required privity was satisfied only where a landlord-tenant rela-
tion existed between the covenanting parties. Alert to the English 
rule that only certain recognized appurtenant easements could be 
created, the court deplored the suggestion that landowners could 
burden their land in any imaginable way. The court could have 
specified certain permissible kinds of running covenants, as had 
been done with easements, but instead asserted its opposition to 
"incidents of a novel kind" as a reason to reject them all. 
The court seemed primarily concerned, however, that pur-
chasers should not be bound by a variety of covenants of which 
they had no knowledge. That policy produced the American re-
cording statutes, which should make Keppell's rule irrelevant in 
this country. The virtual absence of similar statutes in England 
makes the Keppell court's concern at least understandable, but 
it seems very strange that the court asserted that policy in 
Keppell, where the parties had actual notice of the covenant. The 
court simply said that to permit the running of burdens in equity 
even against purchasers with notice would subvert the rule at law. 
The last point could not endure, and· of course it did not, for 
soon thereafter the court in Tulk v. Moxhay15 announced the now 
universally accepted doctrine that restrictive burdens of cove-
nants between owners in fee will be specifically enforced in equity 
against purchasers with notice of the restriction. 18 The court 
foreshadowed future difficulties, however, by the way it stated its 
holding. In dismissing as irrelevant any rule on running covenants 
at common law, the court gave the impression that it was an-
nouncing an entirely new doctrine in which purchase with notice 
was the basis for enforcement. Actually the court seems merely 
to have followed a familiar maneuver of a court of equity by 
mitigating the undue rigors of the common law. Thus the burden 
of a restrictive covenant runs in equity except against a purchaser 
without notice.17 The court said nothing specific about the tradi-
tional requirements of intention and touching and concerning, 
but rarely does a restrictive covenant not touch and concern land 
14. 2 My. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1834). 
15. 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848). 
16. The rule of Tulk v. Moxhay had been previously applied in Whatman v. Gibson, 
9 Sim. 196, 59 Eng. Rep. 333 (Ch. 1838). 
17. London & S.W. Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562, 583 (1882). 
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in some way. The covenant in Tulk to maintain land in an open 
state obviously touches and concerns that land. At least those 
American courts that have followed Tulk v. Moxhay have not 
been fooled in this regard; and either assume, assert, or impose 
the touch and concern requirement. In short, mere notice surely 
does not bind one to every promise made by a predecessor in title. 
On the other side of this coin, it has been asserted that a 
running covenant at common law will bind a subsequent pur-
chaser even if he takes without notice. This proposition, if it was 
ever true, causes little difficulty in England because no burdening 
covenant will run at law in that country except in the landlord-
tenant relation. It should certainly not be true in this country 
under any reasonable interpretation of the recording statutes. 
The final question in the development of the English law on 
running covenants was whether the rul~ of Tulk v. Moxhay ex-
tended to affirmative burdens. We should note initially that some 
nominally affirmative covenants can be enforced negatively, that 
is, by injunction. So it was in Tulk v. Moxhay, where the cove-
nant to "maintain" certain land in an open state without build-
ings was enforced by an injunction against erecting buildings. As 
to truly affirmative burdens, the medieval law, which scholars 
say did not prohibit the running of burdens at law with fee es-
tates, did not distinguish between them and restrictive burdens. 
In fact, most of the very early covenants were affi~mative, includ-
ing but not limited to the so-called "spurious easements,"18 such 
as a covenant to maintain fences. Even after Tulk v. Moxhay, the 
court in Cooke v. Chilcott19 paid little heed to the distinction and 
enforced against a pur_chaser with notice a promise to provide 
spring water to houses on lands retained after a conveyance of the 
land to be burdened. In response to the defendant's contention 
that he was not bound to supply water to anyone, the court noted 
that houses which had been erected in reliance on the promise 
would otherwise be left without water, and then declared, "It 
would be perfectly monstrous that such a defense should be al-
lowed."20 This sounds very much like the reason given by the 
court in Tulk v. Moxhay why a purchaser with notice should not 
take free of a restrictive covenant. To avoid the difficulty of su-
pervising a mandatory injunction, as would be necessary to en-
force an affirmative covenant, the Chilcott court simply enjoined 
the defendant, under pain of contempt of court, against allowing 
18. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 875 (3d ed. 1966). 
19. 3 Ch. D. 694 (1876). 
20. 3 Ch. D. at 701. 
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conditions to exist that would interfere with the performance of 
the covenant. 
Nevertheless, this solution did not survive even as long as 
Keppell's dictum against the enforcement of restrictive burdens 
in equity. The court in Haywood v. Brunswick Building Society21 
held that Tulk could not be extended to enforce a covenant to 
build and keep in repair. This holding was confirmed in 
Austerberry v. Oldham, 22 where one judge remarked that a cove-
nant will not run, except between landlord and tenant, unless it 
amounts to the grant of an easement or a rent-charge.23 In fact, 
one of the judges in Haywood had conceded the possibility that 
an equitable charge could attach to and run with land.24 This 
concession is significant in the light of the Haywood judges' rea-
sons for refusing to extend Tulk v. Moxhay. One judge claimed 
that extending Tulk would make a new equity, "which we can-
not do, " 25 despite the fact that they had done exactly that in 
Tulk v. Moxhay. Although one judge admitted that the old rule 
against mandatory injunctions no longer applied, 28 another said, 
"The covenant to repair can only be enforced by making the 
owner put his hand into his pocket, and there is nothing which 
would justify us going to that length. "27 A third judge said "that 
only such a covenant as can be applied without expenditure of 
money will be enforced against the assignee on the ground of 
notice."28 Notwithstanding the court's emphasis, London & 
Southwest Railway v. Gomm29 subsequently· made it clear that 
the Haywood prohibition extends to all affirmative burdens, not 
merely those requiring the expenditure of money. 
So the English law, when considered all together, is clear 
enough. Essentially, affirmative burdens will not run either at 
law or in equity. That one cannot get damages for breach even of 
a restrictive covenant against anyone other than the promisor is 
of little significance, so long as one can by injunction specifically 
compel performance. 
A search for the reasons for such a law, however, only leads 
one into the typical terse inscrutability of the English judges. The 
21. 8 Q.B.D. 403 (1881). 
22. 29 Ch. D. 750 (C.A. 1885). 
23. 29 Ch. D. at 781. 
24. 8 Q.B.D. at 409. 
25. 8 Q.B.D. at 408. 
26. 8 Q.B.D. at 408. 
27. 8 Q.B.D. at 409. 
28. 8 Q.B.D. at 410. 
29. 20 Ch. D. 562 (1882). 
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remarks of the judges about compelling persons to dig into their 
pockets or expend money may be a simple, offhand, almost trivial 
way of turning a· phrase, and so sharpen the distinction in fact 
between an affirmative and restrictive covenant. But it is hardly 
an explanation. 
It may not be irrelevant to mention the comment of Messrs. 
Megarry and Wade30 that the rule against the running of the 
burden of any covenant at law can be evaded in two ways. First, 
if the conveyers insert the original covenant in each successive 
conveyance of the land of a covenantor, the effect is obviously the 
same as if the original covenant ran with the land. Second, the 
Law of Property Act of 1925 allows a long-term lease to be con-
verted into a fee simple; when so converted, the estate is subject 
to all the covenants that existed under the lease. 
What policy is really served by this law? Is it merely respect 
for and the authority of English judges, that once they firmly 
state a conclusion, even if with only offhand justifications, no 
one thereafter even considers inquiring further? If we in this coun-
try are left to speculate, do the English courts still worry about 
the administrative difficulties of enforcing affirmative duties? Or 
does the English law embody a general assessment that affirma-
tive burdens are simply more onerous than restrictive burdens? 
It can certainly be denied that all affirmative burdens are greater 
than all restrictive ones. Even if they were, is there some reason 
· why such greater burdens should not be borne? Do the English 
courts tacitly assume that the greater the burden the greater the 
restraint on alienation, and that somewhere a line must be 
drawn? 
THE .AMERICAN LAW 
The early American cases, like the early English cases, as-
sumed that the burden of covenants would run with estates in fee 
simple both at law and in equity.31 Most of the early American 
cases, like the early English cases, involved affirmative cove-
nants. In those days, the prevalent concern was not with the 
regulation of urban subdivisions, but with the building and repair 
of fences, bridges, and water power facilities. As more restrictive 
covenants appeared, at least one point became clear: the eventual 
30. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 18, at 751. 
31. Dorsey v. St. Louis, A., & T.H. R.R., 58 Ill. 65 (1871); Carr v. Lowry's Admrx., 
27 Pa. 257 (1856); Kellogg v. Robinson, 6 Vt. 276 (1834). 
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general acceptance of the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay. 32 In due 
course, the courts have managed reasonably well to adapt the 
doctrine of equitable servitudes to modern needs. The running of 
affirmative burdens in equity and the running of all kinds of 
burdens at law is another story. 
When the later English law began to creep into this country, 
the American ·courts reacted in a fascinating but perplexing man-
ner. We can never know whether the American courts misunder-
stood the English cases or deliberately distorted them, but we at 
least know that they found the total prohibition of the running 
of affirmative burdens unacceptable. At any rate, only a few 
American courts acknowledged that the English rule prohibited 
the running of affirmative burdens and applied that rule. New 
York set the most celebrated example in Miller v. Clary by an-
nouncing a rule against the running of affirmative burdens. 33 It 
is striking, however, that Miller was not decided until 1913, after 
the New York courts had allowed affirmative burdens to run 
throughout the nineteenth century. Prior contrary decisions were 
classified as exceptions, a foreshadowing that other exceptions 
might subsequently appear. In fact, more exceptions did appear, 
which led commentators to suggest that the court had so qualified 
its doctrine that it would eventually treat Miller v. Clary as an 
aberration and abandon it altogether. That Miller has not been 
abandoned deserves further attention in due course. 
New Jersey rejected the running of affirmative burdens in 
early cases, 34 but its superior court has recently modified if not 
abandoned that course. 35 Ignoring the doctrine of Tulk v. 
Moxhay; an early Virginia case36 applied the English common-
law rule to deny an injunction against the violation of a restrictive 
covenant. The decision, however, also rested on the ground that 
the restriction was an unlawful restraint of trade. More recently, 
the West Virginia court37 asserted the English rule to deny an heir 
of the covenantor the recovery of oil and gas royalties, but it also 
seemed to rely on the ground that the covenant did not touch and 
concern the land. Dictum in an early Rhode Island case declared 
32. See Sims, supra note 6, at 19-27. 
33. 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913). 
34. See cases cited in Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 117 N.J. Super. 155, 160-61, 283 
A.2d 911, 914 (Ch. Div. 1971). 
35. Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 117 N.J. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911 (Ch. Div. 1971). 
36. Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 562 (1886). 
37. McIntosh v. Vail, 126 W.Va. 395, 28 S.E.2d 607 (1943); cf. Cole v. Seamonde, 87 
W.Va. 19, 104 S.E. 747 (1920) (recognizing enforceability of equitable servitude against 
purchaser with notice). 
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that the English rule prevented the running of a covenant at law, 
but not in equity.38 
THE PRIVITY PROBLEM 
The English rule was first significantly modified tit an early 
date in Massachusetts. Reasoning by analogy from the English 
common-law rule requiring privity_ of estate between the cove-
nanting parties, which in England could only be satisfied by a 
landlord-tenant relation, the court declared that the existence in 
one of the parties of an easement in the land of the other party 
sufficed to create privity of estate. 39 This has been called "sub-
stituted privity."40 Signs of this rule have appeared in several 
other states.41 An early case in Wisconsin,42 for example, held that 
the privity requirement was satisfied because the parties were 
tenants in common of mineral interests. 
The most perplexing American development was the appear-
ance and growth of the notion of privity of estate as a requirement 
that for a covenant to run it must be accompanied by a convey-
ance of affected land from one of the covenanting parties to the 
other. This has been called "instantaneous privity. "43 It is unclear 
whether this idea was a drastic effort to reduce the rigors of the 
English law or was purely indigenous. At any rate, courts have 
sometimes supported it simply with the old dictum in Webb v. 
Russell, 44 though Lord Kenyon surely did not have this meaning 
in mind. In later cases it became the accepted meaning of the 
privity requirement, although I know of no case in which the court 
even intimated that it was declaring new law. 
The rule appeared almost surreptitiously· and spread very 
gradually. Mr. Sims suggested that it may have originated in the 
old implied covenants of title from which, it has been argued, 
modem covenants were derived. 45 It may also have grown from a 
misunderstanding of the Massachusetts notion of privity, which 
38. Town of Middletown v. Newport Hosp., 16 R.I. 319, 332, 15 A. 800, 803 (1888). 
39. Morse v. Aldrich, 36 Mass. 449, 454 (1837). See Hurd v. Curtis, 36 Mass. 459, 464 
(1837). In an early case, the Massachusetts court did not impose any privity requirements 
in applying the rule of Tulk v. Moxhay to a restrictive covenant. Parker v. Nightingale, 
88 Mass. 341 (1863). 
40. C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 128. 
41. Id. at 130 n.116. 
42. Crawford v. Witherbee, 77 Wis. 419, 46 N.W. 545 (1890). 
43. 2 AMErucAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). 
44. 3 T.R. 393, 100 Eng. Rep. 639, 644 (K.B. 1789). 
45. H. SIMS, supra note 6, at 195. 
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permitted the creation of an easement by the same instrument 
that contained the covenant. In Hurd v. Curtis, the Massachu-
setts court said, "Their [the covenanting parties'] estates were 
several, and there was no grant of any interest in the real estate 
of either party, to which the covenants could be annexed."46 This 
statement may have motivated a New York court's citation of 
Hurd v. Curtis for the proposition that "[t]he true distinction 
appears to be that if the covenant is made on the sale of property, 
in a case like the present, it runs with the land. "47 
It was surprising to me that the first clear declaration of the 
rule of instantaneous privity that I have seen was a dictum in an 
Arkansas48 case involving the running of a covenant for title, 
though the dictum seems broadly enough stated to cover all cove-
nants. Sixteen years later a Wisconsin court casually mentioned 
the privity rule as a ground for permitting the running of the 
burden of a covenant to share the expenses of repairing a dam.49 
After several more years, the privity requirement was imposed in 
Maine to prevent the running of the burden of another affirma-
tive covenant. 50 One year later in another affirmative burden 
case, the New Hampshire court51 cited the earlier Wisconsin case 
in recognition of the privity requirement. The most famous case 
cited to stand for instantaneous privity is Wheeler v. Schad, GZ 
although the opinion leaves some doubt whether the court as-
serted that rule or the Massachusetts rule. 
In due course the rule requiring a grant between the cove-
nanting parties was accepted in a substantial number of jurisdic-
tions, 53 but I know of no court that has attempted to explain or 
justify the rule in terms of public policy. Three states passed 
statutes which were probably derived from the Field Code and 
which provide that "certain covenants, contained in grants of 
estates in real property, are appurtenant to such estates . . . . 
Such covenants are said to run with the land. "54 According to the 
46. 36 Mass. 459, 464 (1837). 
47. Denman v. Prince, 40 Barb. 213, 216 (N.Y. 1862). 
48. Ross v. Turner, 7 Ark. 132, 145 (1846). 
49. Wooliscroft v. Norton, 15 Wis. 198 (1862). 
50. Smith v. Kelley, 56 Me. 64 (1868). 
51. Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N.H. 475 (1869). 
52. 7 Nev. 204 (1871). 
53. 5 R. POWELL, REAL PRoPERTY ,r 674 at 176 (1949). Several recent cases recognize 
the rule: Carlson v. Libby, 137 Conn. 362, 77 A.2d 332 (1950); Johnson v. Myers, 226 Ga. 
23, 172 S.E.2d 421 (1970); Hall v. Risley, 188 Or. 69,213 P.2d 818 (1950); Clear Lake Apts., 
Inc. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 537 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), affd. sub nom. Clear 
Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1977). 
54. MONT. REv. CODE§ 58-304 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 47-04-24 (1960); S.D. COMP, 
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Montana court, that statute bars the running of any covenant not 
contained in the grant of the real property to be charged. 55 Pre-
sumably a similar provision once appeared in the California Civil 
Code. If so, it has been amended to provide the opposite,56 that 
is, that landowners not otherwise associated· can make a running 
covenant. In a few states this privity rule has been rejected or 
been ignored in cases where it would be applicable.57 This leaves 
probably a majority of the states in which the need for some kind 
of horizontal privity has not been decided. 
Even under the English rule, which requires privity by ten-
ure, an affirmative burden can be cast in the form. of a lien, 
thereby avoiding a privity problem. The New York court in the 
famous Neponsit case58 did not allow its rule against the running 
of affirmative burdens to prevent the enforcement of a lien given 
to secure payment for services to property. Of course not every 
affirmative covenant will be construed as a lien, but in the Mon-
tana case59 mentioned above the court did just that when it said 
that one who intends to bind his land or successors to such a 
burden in substance creates a lien. The Mississippi court rather 
recently held the same. 60 In addition, a court confused by the 
conceptual distinctions between easements and covenants may 
construe a promise to furnish water from a reservoir to the prom-
isee's reservoir, pipeline, or ditch as an easement in the promisee. 
The court would thereby avoid any problem about privity.61 
It is widely assumed that under the rule of Tulk v. Moxhay 
the instantaneous privity requirement does not bar the equitable 
enforcement of covenants against takers of the promisor's land 
with notice. This assumption follows naturally from the Tulk 
court's notion that the rule of its case had nothing to do with 
running covenants. That notion is conceptually· supported by the 
LAws § 43-12-1 (1967). 
55. Orchard Home11 Ditch Co. v. Snavely, 117 Mont. 484, 159 P.2d 521 (1945). 
56. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1978). 
57. E.g., Mueller v. Bankers Trust Co., 262 Mich. 53,247 N.W. 103 (1933); Bolles v. 
Pecos lrrig. Co., 23 N.M. 32, 167 P. 280 (1917); Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N.C. 1 (1870); 
Hom v. Miller, 136 Pa. 640, 20 A. 706 (1890). 
58. Neponsit Property Owners' Assn. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 
15 N.E.2d 793 (1938). 
59. Orchard Homes Ditch Co. v. Snavely, 117 Mont. 484, 159 P.2d 521 (1945). 
60. Mendrop v. Harrell, 233 Miss. 679, 103 So. 2d 418 (1958). See also Burton-Jones 
Dev., Inc. v. Flake, 368 Mich. 122, 117 N.W.2d 110 (1962); 2 .AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY 
§ 9.17 n.2 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). 
61. Fitzstephens v. Watson, 218 Or. 185,344 P.2d 221 (1959); cf. Farmers' High Line 
Canal & Reservoir Co. v. New Hampshire Real Estate Co.,-40 Colo. 467, 92 P. 290 (1907) 
(covenants in lease for irrigation-ditch owner to supply water to surrounding landowners 
created easement). 
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theory that an equitable servitude, at least if restrictive, is an 
equitable easement created by a promise. Some cases expressly 
recognize the inapplicability in equity of any privity require-
ment, 62 and I know of no authority to the contrary. The question 
seldom arises, however, for equitable servitudes are usually cre-
ated by conveyances of one or more parcels of land. A suit for a 
declaratory judgment, however, can cloud any substantive issue, 
including this one, and a recent Georgia court, without any recog-
nition of the possibility of equitable enforcement, declared a re-
strictive promise of one landowner to his neighbor null and void 
for want of privity of estate. 63 
Except in New York and possibly New Jersey, the American 
rules governing the running of covenants at law have been applied 
indiscriminately to both negative and affirmative covenants, as 
would be expected where "privity" means something very differ-
ent from the English rule that no burden can run at law except 
between landlord and tenant. Only rather recently has the ques-
tion been raised whether affirmative burdens also run in equity 
against purchasers with notice. We have seen that the English 
authority is well established against such an extension of Tulk v. 
Moxhay. 64 The prevalent notion of the American courts that Eng-
lish law concerned only privity, and not the running of affirma-
tive burdens, made it easy for them to ignore the full import of 
the English cases. Yet as recently as the appearance of his famous 
book, 65 Judge Clark cautiously admonished that "it would seem 
desirable to consider these interests [equitable servitudes] as 
restricted to easements, to uphold them only as negative restric-
tions, and to allow the affirmative running encumbrances to wait 
upon the development of a more enlightened policy towards the 
covenant running with the land." Judge Clark must have had in 
mind the conceptual difficulty of treating an affirmative burden 
as an easement. Nevertheless, the American courts have virtually 
ignored the English rule in this regard, and over a considerable 
time have extended the Tulk doctrine to affirmative burdens, 66 
62. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Riviera Estates Assn., 7 Cal. App. 3d 449, 344 P,2d 
221, 87 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1970); Fitzstephens v. Watson, 218 Or. 185, 344 P.2d 221 (1959); 
Clear Lake Apts., Inc. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 537 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), affd. 
sub nom. Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 
1977). 
63. Johnson v. Myers, 226 Ga. 23, 172 S.E.2d 421 (1970). 
64. Haywood v. Brunswick Bldg. Socy., 8 Q.B.D. 403 (1881). 
65. C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 180. 
66. Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Assn., 258 Ark. 757, 528 S.W.2d 651 
(1975); Coulter v. Sausalito Bay Water Co., 122 Cal. App. 480, 10 P.2d 780 (1932); Hottell 
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although an occasional failure to meet the touching and concern-
ing requirement bars the result. 67 
Those who have surveyed the American developments this 
far will be struck by the absurdity of the American privity re-
quirements. Noting the dearth of explanations by the courts of 
those rules in policy terms, what policy do they serve? Were these 
developments merely efforts to liberalize the English strictures as 
much as possible without denying altogether that as fetters on 
alienability running covenants ought to be discouraged? If so, 
how significant is a doctrine that does not apply to most cases 
even at law, and that neighboring landowners in most jurisdic-
tions can evade by "strawman" conveyances? And if affirmative 
burdens do run in equity, have not the privity rules virtually 
become a dead letter? 
The thought occurred to me that courts might have uncon-
sciously supported the instantaneous privity rule on the ground 
that the recording of the convenanting parties' conveyance as-
sures ~hat the covenantor's successors will receive adequate no-
tice of.the covenant.68 This of course assumes that a mere agree-
ment oetween landowners without a conveyance will not be re-
corded or indeed may not be entitled to record. It further assumes 
that an unrecorded covenant binds a successor without notice. 
This notion about recording implies that a covenant at law cre-
ates no property interest and so is not a conveyance. The answer 
is not to circumscribe reasonable arrangements between neigh-
boring landowners by a so-called privity requirement. Many 
courts will consider covenants respecting land recordable as 
v. Farmers' Protective Assn., 25 Colo. 67, 63 P. 327 (1898); Everett Factories & Terminal 
Corp. v. Oldetyme Distillers Corp., 300 Mass. 499, 16 N.E.2d 829 (1938); Greenspan v. 
Rehberg, 57 Mich. App. 310, 224 N.W.2d 67 (1974); Mendrop v. Harrell, 233 Miss. 679, 
103 So. 2d 418 (1958); Fitzstephens v. Watson, 218 Or. 185, 344 P.2d 221 (1959); Ball v. 
Rio Grande Canal Co., 266 S.W. 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); West Va. Transp. Co.·v. Ohio 
River Pipe Line Co., 22 W.Va. 600 (1883); see Murphy v. Kerr, 6 F.2d 908, 911 (8th Cir. 
1925); Pittsburg, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Bosworth, 46 Ohio St. 81, 86, 18 N.E. 533,535 (1888). 
In Fitzstephens v. Watson the court spoke in general terms about the running of affirma-
tive covenants in equity, but in fact the covenant was enforced negatively, by injunction, 
as in Tulk v. Moxhay. Other cases could be cited in which courts spoke as though they 
were enforcing affirmative burdens, but in which enforcement was decreed by injunction. 
67. Clear Lake Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 649 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. 1977); 
Cole v. Seamonds, 87 W.Va. 19 (1920). 
68. In Sjoblom v. Mark, 103 Minn. 193, 202-03, 114 N.W. 746, 750 (1908), the court 
held that a covenant between neighboring landowners not to sell liquor, if recorded, could 
n9t give notice because it created no interest in land. If the covenant WP.re otherwise 
enforceable in equity, such a view is objectionable and probably does not now prevail; but 
the court added that its view would be otherwise if the covenant were embraced in a deed. 
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transactions "affecting" title to land. 69 In jurisdictions with re-
cording laws that require a "conveyance," due regard for the 
spirit and purpose of recording laws should permit a sufficiently 
liberal construction of the word. If not, the recording statutes 
could be amended. The Restatement has taken this position. 70 
In view of the American developments outlined above, it is 
striking that the Restatement declared a rule of privity in the 
alternative: that satisfaction of either the Massachusetts or the 
instantaneous variety suffices as privity at law.71 The Restate-
ment's rule was greeted by the indignant outcries of commenta-
tors, most notably the polemics of Judge Clark.72 As long as 
the American Law Institute felt free to take liberties with the 
law in declaring alternative rules, why did it declare any privity 
requirement at all? It is hardly a sufficient rationale to say that 
a rejection of the English requirement of a landlord-tenant rela-
tion requires a substitution of some other community of interest 
between the covenanting parties. 
It has not been my purpose here merely to belabor once more 
the old controversies about privity of estate. I have been search-
ing for some relevant, defensible considerations of public policy. 
The English rule, for some unstated reason, seems to find affir-
mative burdens objectionable. In its generality that notion has 
been rejected in this country. So far, no other has been found. 
THE RUNNING OF AFFIRMATIVE BURDENS 
After a considerable period of silence following the New York 
court's declaration against the running of affirmative burdens 
(presumably both at law and in equity) in Miller v. Clary, 73 the 
court in Neponsit14 upheld the running of a subdivision lot-
owner's promise to contribute to the cost of maintaining facilities 
for the benefit of all the lot owners. The court made no attempt 
69. Malicke v. Milan, 320 Mich. 65, 30 N.W.2d 440 (1948), reud., reh. den., per 
curiam, 320 Mich. 65, 32 N.W.2d 353 (1948); Cook v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 281 
S.W.2d 415 (Mo. App. 1955); Loeb v. Watkins, 428 Pa. 480, 240 A.2d 513 (1968); Annot., 
4 A.L.R.2d 1419 (1949). But see Sjoblom v. Mark, 103 Minn. 193, 114 N.W. 746 (1908). 
70. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 533 (1944); cf. UNIFORM SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND 
TRANSFERS ACT § 2-301 (would abolish all restrictions on eligibility for recording of docu-
ment except ability to be processed by equipment in recording office). 
71. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY§ 534 (1944). 
72. C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 137, 206. 
73. 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913). 
74. Neponsit Property Owners' Assn. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 
15 N.E.2d 793 (1938). 
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to square this with Miller v. Clary on its facts, but simply empha-
sized the proper application of the touching and concerning re-
quirement. It was suspected that the court had overruled Miller 
v. Clary, or at least was preparing to do so. After twenty more 
years, in Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 75 the court 
permitted the running of a promise to supply heat from the build-
ing on one parcel of land to the promisee's building on other land. 
After relying on Neponsit and reiterating its emphasis not only 
that the promise touch and concern the land, but that that re-
quirement be ·decided by the covenant's effect rather than by 
technical distinctions, the court added one enlightening sentence: 
"The fear expressed that the covenant imposes an undue restric-
tion on alienation or an onerous burden in perpetuity is dispelled 
by the fact that by its terms it may run with the land only as long 
as both buildings are standing and in use. "76 
The New York court recently spoke further on this matter in 
Eagle Enterprises v. Gross, 77 where a corporate subdivider who 
conveyed a subdivision lot promised to supply water from May 1 
to October 1 of each year from a well on its land, and the grantee 
promised to receive it and pay a $35 annual fee. Recovery was 
denied when a successor to the grantor sued a successor to the 
grantee to co_llect the fee. We may recall that in Chilcott v. 
Cooke, 78 the later-repudiated English case involving a similar 
covenant, the court said that it would be "perfectly monstr~ms" 
to allow one who promised to supply water to terminate the obli-
gation simply by conveying his land. In Eagle, however, it was the 
grantee's successor who balked at taking and paying for the 
water. The court decided in part on a narrow construction of the 
touching and concerning requirement, since the obligation was 
only seasonal and the defendant as well as other lot owners simi-
larly situated were not actually dependent on the plaintiffs sup-
ply of water. Neponsit was distinguished on the ground that the 
promisor there had received an easement to "utilize public areas 
in the subdivision," to which the obligation to pay was related. 79 
The court also noted the affirmative nature of the covenant and 
cited Nicholson for the proposition that covenants are "dis-
favored" because of the fear that they impose "an undue restric-
tion on alienation or an onerous burden in perpetuity." Noting 
75. 7 N.Y.2d 240, 164 N.E.2d 832 (1959). 
76. 7 N.Y.2d at 246, 164 N.E.2d at 835. 
77. 39 N.Y.2d 505, 349 N.E.2d 816 (1976). 
78. 3 Ch. D. 694, 701 (1876). 
79. 39 N.Y.2d at 509, 349 N.E.2d at 819. 
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the unlimited duration of this covenant, the court said, "Thus, 
the covenant falls prey to the criticism that it creates a burden 
in perpetuity, and purports to bind all future owners, regardless 
of the use to which the land is put."80 On .this ground also the 
covenant was not excepted from the rule against the running of 
affirmative covenants. 
New Jersey's Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc. 81 was a Neponsit-
type case in which a corporate subdivision developer conveyed to 
the Beekmere Corporation an easement of access to a lake within 
the subdivision and inserted in deeds to residential lots a promise 
by lot owners to purchase one share of common stock in the corpo-
ration for not more than $100 and to comply with the corpora-
tion's constitution and bylaws. In a class action to construe the 
covenant, the court faced early cases that seemed to support the 
English rule against the running of all burdens with fee estates 
at law and in favor of confining the equitable rule of Tulk v. 
Moxhay to restrictive covenants. Acknowledging the New York 
developments concerning affirmative burdens, especially 
Neponsit and Nicholson, as well as the general acceptance of the 
running of affirmative burdens elsewhere, the court concluded 
that, whatever the New Jersey rule was at law, affirmative bur-
dens should be allowed to run in equity. That conclusion is strik-
ing, for if some policy condemns the running of affirmative bur-
dens, such a policy would seem to be more offended by specific 
enforcement than by the recovery of damages for breach. 
The court, however, gave two reasons for refusing to enforce 
this covenant. First, the subdivision lacked a proper "neighbor-
hood scheme, "82 a uniformity of obligation, since the common 
grantor had released a substantial number of the lots from the 
covenant. Second, the covenant involved a "vagueness of terms 
and consequent restraint on alienation."83 The court mentioned 
several reasons for this second conclusion. Since the covenant 
obligated lot owners to conform to the corporation's bylaws, 
which contained nothing pertinent to the matter, no formula 
existed to calculate future assessments and thus no safeguard 
existed against inequitable assessments. Also, the corporation 
was not required to devote the assessed funds to the develop-
ment of the subdivision. Further, the lot-owners' shares were nei-
ther transferable nor otherwise redeemable. Finally, no specific 
80. 39 N.Y.2d at 510, 349 N.E.2d at 820. 
81. 117 N.J. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911 (Ch. Div. 1971). 
82. 117 N.J. Super. at 171, 283 A.2d at 919. · 
83. 117 N.J. Super. at 171, 283 A.2d at 920. 
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time limited the covenant's duration. The court did not say, how-
ever, that the covenant was unenforceable even against the origi-
nal lot purchasers. Indeed, the reference to the .covenant as a 
restraint on alienation and the fact that these plaintiffs were 
successors to original purchasers justifies the inference that the 
court meant merely that the covenant could not bind successors. 
We might wonder why, given its concern about vagueness, 
the court could not have indulged in a more liberal interpretation 
of such a covenant. Could the court not have found in the cove-
nant's obvious purpose an implicit requirement that both the 
amount of the assessment and the use of the funds be limited to 
necessary or reasonable improvements for the benefit of all the 
residents? 
One might consider these developments in New York and 
New Jersey as significant only as further definitions of the process 
of relaxing earlier opposition to the running of affirmative bur-
dens. That is, one might assume that these developments are not 
relevant in jurisdictions that never had any rule against the run-
ning of affirmative burdens. It is of special interest, therefore, 
that these same ideas have recently appeared in other jurisdic-
tions. In Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Asso-
ciation, 84 the _Arkansas court distinguished Beekmere on the 
ground that sufficiently definite terms governed the promise in 
question to compute an assessment and determine the use of the 
proceeds. A Washington court reached a similar result in Rodruck 
v. Sand Point Maintenance Commission. 85 We might also note in 
Rodruck that membership in the corporate body charged with 
managing the facilities and levying the assessments would, by the 
terms of the bylaws, run to the successor of the member's lot, to 
which his membership was appurtenant. In Japanese Gardens 
Mobile Estates, Inc. v. Hunt, 86 a Florida case, mobile-home lot 
owners were subject to a stated monthly assessment and to any 
increased assessments approved by a majority of the lot owners. 
The case did not question the running of these promises or even 
whether they were valid and binding on original purchasers. 
Rather, the validity of a particular increased assessment was dis-
puted and the court remanded the case to ascertain whether the 
assessment was made arbitrarily or for a proper purpose. 
In respect to the duration of affirmative covenants, two 
courts have recently reached the obvious conclusion that cove-
84. 258 Ark. 757, 764, 528 S.W.2d 651, 655 (1975). 
85. 48 Wash. 2d 565, 295 P.2d 714 (1956). 
86. 261 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). 
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nants similar to· those in Beekmere cannot violate the Rule 
Against Perpetuities because the interests involved are vested. 87 
A Florida Court of Appeals, however, has responded to this ques-
tion somewhat differently. In Henthorn v. Tripar Land Develop-
ment Corp., 88 annual subdivision charges were to continue until 
January 1, 2000, and automatically for ten-year periods thereafter 
unless repealed by a majority vote of the owners. The court saw 
no difficulty with the initial term, but held the extension provi-
sions invalid for the same policy reasons that invalidate interests 
under the Rule Against Perpetuities. Apparently the court was 
not actually applying that rule, but only borrowing its policy. Nor 
did the court borrow the perpetuity period, which the covenant's 
initial period exceeded. The ruling is not clear, however, for the 
court cited Gray's famous perpetuity treatise at the point where 
Gray states that the Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to 
contracts generally, but does apply to option contracts because 
they are held to create equitable future interests in property. 89 
Does the court contend that these covenants were valid during 
the initiaf period because the property interests, if any, were 
vested, but that they were void thereafter because they created 
contingent future interests in property? If so, we could raise the 
technical objection that such future interests were def easible, not 
contingent, since future action by the lot owners was necessary, 
not to continue, but only to terminate the agreement. The court 
further confused the matter by relying on an earlier case which 
had startlingly concluded that lot-assessment provisions can be 
terminated by either party at will upon reasonable notice if their 
duration cannot be ascertained from their terms.90 The court in 
that earlier case said further that such provisions expressly made 
perpetual are unenforceable in equity, because they would im-
pose upon a court an endless and inappropriate duty of supervi-
sion. 
Judicial attacks upon the duration of restrictive covenants 
might seem surprising. We have lived a long time without any 
explicit law on the matter. If these burdens are not wholly analo-
gous to perpetual easements, or rather easements in fee, the equi-
table defense of "changed conditions"81 may preclude the ques-
87. Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Assn., 258 Ark. 757, 628 S.W.2d 661 
(1976); Lowry v. Norris Lake Shores Dev. Corp., 231 Ga. 649, 203 S.E.2d 171 (1974). 
88. 221 So.2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). 
89. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETurnF.s §§ 329-330.3 (4th ed. 1942). 
90. Collins v. Pie-Town Water Works, Inc., 166 So. 2d 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). 
91. 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.39 (A.J. Casner ed. 1962). 
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tion from arising, at least in the most common situation of equita-
ble servitudes upon subdivision ownership. The Texas court, 
however, though it found nothing in the terms of a simple restric-
tion of property to residential use to limit its duration, dismissed 
a policy argument against the restriction by saying simply that 
it was not "unreasonable at this time."92 Similarly, a Florida 
court granted a petition to remove a restrictive covenant that 
allegedly clouded title because of changed conditions, but added 
that where such a covenant's duration has not been expressly 
limited, a reasonable limitation should be implied as a matter of 
construction. That is, the restriction should not endure longer 
than circumstances and its purpose indicate is reasonable.93 
In certain circumstances the changed conditions defense, as 
usually interpreted, may not be relevant. A Missouri court faced 
with a covenant not to operate a gasoline station refused to re-
lease the promisor's successor from the restriction. 94 The court 
denied that the restriction's indefinite duration was unreasonable 
for, as stated in the Texas case noted above, 95 the owner of the 
burdened property can challenge the restriction should it later 
become unreasonable. A California court agreed to enjoin the 
operation of a grocery store in violation of a covenant. The cove-
nant was not perpetual, the court said, but valid only so long as 
the promisee remains in the grocery business. 98 
In respect to a matter more obviously related to direct re-
straints on alienation, one court has recently held that a condo-
minium trailer park developer-grantor who reserved the exclu-
sive right to rent the condominium units did not unreasonably 
restrain alienation.97 The court emphasized that the unit owners 
were unrestricted in the sale of their units. On the other hand, a 
different court held that a restriction against the sale of subdivi-
sion lots to anyone "who would be disapproved for membership 
in the beach club" established for lot owners was an unreasonable 
restraint on alienation. 98 
92. Moore v. Smith, 443 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Tex. 1969). 
93. Barton v. Moline· Properties, Inc., 121 Fla. 683, 164 So. 551 (1935). See also 
Crissman v. Dedakis, 330 So. 2d 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). 
94. Hall v. American Oil Co., 504 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. App. 1973}. 
95. Moore v. Smith, 443 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1969), discussed in text at note 92 supra. 
96. Doo v. Packwood, 265 Cal. App. 2d 752, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1968). 
97. Holiday Out in America at St. Lucie, Inc. v. Bowes, 285 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1973). 
98. Tuckerton Beach Club v. Bender, 91 N.J. Super. 167,169,219 A.2d 529,530 (App. 
Div. 1966). 
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THE SEARCH FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
In addition to the traditional requirements of contract law, 
it is clear that a covenant respecting land, like conditions or 
limitations in dispositive instruments, may for a variety of rea-
sons violate public policy, even as between the original parties. 99 
My concern, however, is more limited. I wish to discover what 
policies, if any, are relevant not to the validity of covenants as 
between the original parties, but to the running of a covenant's 
burden to a successor of the promisor. This problem may also 
embrace incidentally cases in which the validity of a covenant 
between the original parties relates to its duration and to that 
extent affects its enforceability against successors of the promi-
sor. 
My purpose in this Article is twofold. I first sought to clear 
the air, or cleanse the stables, to discover which of the old, techni-
cal impediments to the running of burdens really disguise un-
stated or poorly conceived policy concerns. The English law may 
reflect the notion that affirmative burdens are more onerous than 
restrictive ones and therefore restrain alienation unreasonably, 
but that policy sweeps far too broadly. At any rate, it has not been 
accepted in this country. The search for policy in the American 
privity-of-estate doctrine has been equally frustrating. It is not 
even certain that courts apply the doctrine with any specific pol-
icy in mind. Whatever their policies may be, the courts have so 
99. The most obvious are those that violate the constitutional doctrine against racial 
restrictions. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). For another recent example, a land 
developer convenanted with a city to limit the private use of roadways within a subdivi-
sion, the covenant entitling him to declare these restrictions void if any suit were brought 
to enjoin his use of the private roadway. When the plaintiffs sought a declaration of their 
rights under the covenant, presumably suing as third-party beneficiaries, the court held 
that the right reserved by the covenantor was void because it violated the public policy 
against contracts that deny access to courts or attempt to deprive courts of their inherent 
jurisdiction. This provision was especially vulnerable since it affected the rights of persons 
who were not parties to the agreement. Fugazzoto v. Brookwood One, 295 Ala. 169, 325 
So. 2d 161 (1976). 
The validity of a provision to amend a restrictive covenant by a proper vote of lot 
owners has been challenged. One court recently decided that such a provision and an 
amendment made pursuant to it were valid if not unreasonable or prohibited by law, 
Harrison v. Air Park Estates Zoning Comm., 533 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). 
"Discretionary servitudes" pose the related problem of building plans that must be ap-
proved by a developer-grantor, a committee appointed by him, or a majority oflot owners. 
Most of the recent cases have approved such provisions where their enforcement is sought 
reasonably, in good faith, and in furtherance of a development scheme. Rhue v. Cheyenne 
Homes, Inc., 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (1969); Reichman, Residential Private Govern-
ments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 253, 291-300 (1976); Annot., 19 A.L.R. 
2d 1274 (1951). Apart from questions of vagueness or of touching and concerning, it is not 
clear what public policies these decisions involve. 
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worked through and around the privity doctrine to leave it a 
barren and useless impediment. 
I have not concluded, however, that no policy factors govern 
the running of covenants. Rather, in asserting my second purpose 
I am now certain that the courts must make ~ straightforward 
approach to the policy question stripped of its distracting and 
outworn technical garb. That requires a tentative effort to iden-
tify the types of issues or problems that invoke policy considera-
tions. Such an inquiry is difficult because it casts us adrift with-
out the benefit of much judicial analysis or assessment, since 
courts seldom approach the question in these terms. Since we are 
searching for policies that affect the running of the burden of 
covenants rather than a covenant's initial validity, we will pri-
marily inspect the relationship between the running of covenants 
and the policy against fetters on alienability. 
If the courts have given us little help in our pursuit of public 
policy, the Restatement at least offers a rationale against cove-
nants burdening land, although it says little about alienability as 
such. 100 The Restatement seeks to protect "the social interest in 
the utilization of land" from the potential "disadvantageous ef-
fect upon its use and improvement" imposed by the burdens of 
covenants respecting land. As to the running of the burdens in 
equity, 101 the Restatement says that "a promise respecting the use 
of land may be invalid because it unreasonably restricts the use 
of land." It explains further that the restriction's harm may be 
"so disproportionate to the benefit produced by the performance 
of the promise that the promise ought not to be enforced." The 
Restatement concedes that its rule is necessarily vague and that 
determining proportions of harm and benefit will involve a vari-
ety of factors. The comment mentions several relevant factors, 
including the covenant's duration. Only in respect to duration 
does the Restatement's policy specifically relate to the running of 
a covenant as distinguished from its initial validity. 
In support of its much-criticized rule that the burden of a 
covenant will not run unless its performance will physically bene-
fit either the promisee's or the promisor's land, 102 the Restatement 
rationale implies that any covenant that limits land use offends 
public policy in some degree, and that no covenant will run unless 
some social advantage compensates for the disadvantage caused 
by the burden. The deterrent of a burden on land to a prospective 
100. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537, Comment a (1944). 
101. Id. § 539, Comments e, f. 
102. Id. § 537, Comment a. 
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purchaser, that is, the restraint on alienation, is stated as one 
consequence of a burden that restricts land use. More will be said 
about this section of the Restatement when referring to the touch-
ing and concerning requirement. At this point, I suggest merely 
that there is no more reason to say that all covenants affecting 
land use are in some degree offensive than to conclude the same 
about easements. On the other hand, good reason does· exist to 
find a burden on use unreasonable in some circumstances and to 
say that a burden's duration may be relevant to its unreasona-
bleness. If we say no more than this, it makes little difference 
whether we characterize the policy to be against unreasonable 
restrictions on land use or against restrictions on land use that 
constitute unreasonable restraints upon alienation. 
If we begin our pursuit of the policy reasons for protecting 
alienability of property by looking at the several doctrines or 
varying policies that profess to preserve alienability, we may dis-
cover why we seem to be lost at sea in identifying the policy 
factors that concern the running of covenants. The Rule Against 
Perpetuities, the rules against direct restraints on alienation, and 
the rules governing the duration of trusts and the accumulation 
of income, have all been thought to be related in policy terms. 
But the policy supporting even the most clearly defined of these 
doctrines, the Rule Against Perpetuities, is not clear. Does the 
Rule express a concern about the economic consequences of indi-
rectly fettered alienability or about the social consequences of too 
much dead-hand control of property?103 In any event, the Rule 
rarely applies to running covenants, with the notable exception 
of its application to options in gross to purchase land, 104 which 
may indeed be convenants running with the land. It has long been 
argued that such application is conceptually and functionally 
improper.105 New legislation has passed that exempts options 
from the Rule but limits their duration to a period of years.100 
The rule against so-called direct restraints on alienation ap-
plies simply and clearly enough to one kind of restraint. Explicit 
prohibitions against the alienation of land conveyed in fee simple, 
including prohibitions in the form of conditions that demand 
forfeiture on breach, as well as those in the form of contracts, are 
illegal and void. 107 A limited doctrine allows valid partial re-
103. L. SIMES, PUBuc PouCY AND THE DEAD HANo 32 (1955). 
104. 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY§ 24.56 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). 
105. Id.; Berg, Long-Term Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities (pts. 1-3), 37 
CALIF. L. REv. 1, 235, 236, 419, 447 (1949). 
106. !LI.. REv. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(7) (1973); P.A. 76-1428, § 4, eff. Sept. 22, 1969. 
107. 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY§ 26.15 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). 
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straints to deny alienation to certain persons or classes, provided 
of course that the classification is not racial.108 Generally, how-
ever, a restraint is illegal without regard to its duration.1ai In 
response to the severity of this dogma, a minority of courts have 
accepted a doctrine of "reasonable restraints" which tolerates 
restraints limited to certain specific periods of time. 110 
The perplexing part of this law is encountered when one 
turns from explicit prohibitions or restrictions upon alienation to 
a variety of restrictions upon conduct (most commonly restric-
tions on land use) that may in effect discourage or inhibit aliena-
bility. The main difficulty here derives from certain types of en-
cumbrances that are incontestably valid whatever their possible 
effect on alienability. Most flagrant are those traditional future 
interests reserved by conveyors: the possibility of reverter and the 
right of entry for condition broken. Outside the panoply of es-
tates, easements, and related servitudes are the most common 
incorporeal interests in property. Not all easements inhibit alien-
ation, but surely some do; yet I do not recall any case that held 
an easement to be an unlawful restraint on alienation. 
This does not mean that only explicit restrictions on aliena-
tion are unlawful. Courts have expressed concern, for instance, 
that the running of options in gross to purchase land, including 
preemptive options or the so-called rights of first refusal, will 
inhibit alienability. As stated above, 111 regular options have 
usually been subjected to the Rule Against Perpetuities and per-
haps for this reason have escaped the charge that they might 
unlawfully restrain alienation apart from their duration. One 
might explain this by saying that an option which does in fact 
inhibit alienation is a reasonable restraint if it does not last too 
long. It seems odd in contrast, therefore, that most courts have 
not only subjected preemptive options to the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities, 112 but have declared that they may also constitute unrea-
sonable restraints on alienation regardless of their duration.113 
Several factors are relevant to the unreasonableness of the re-
straint, the most common mark of an unreasonable restraint 
being the right to buy at a fixed price rather than at the price 
offered by a third person. Clearly, however, a court that under-
108. Id. §§ 26.31-.34. 
109. Id. § 26.19. 
110. Id. §§ 26.22, .23. 
111. See text at note 104 supra. 
112. See Browder, Restraints on the Alienation of Condominium Units, 1970 U. ILI.. 
L.F. 231, 248. 
113. Id. at 240, 240-43. 
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takes to decide whether such a device unreasonably restrains 
alienation does not thereby commit itself to the minority view 
that tolerates some explicit restraints on alienation. 
· Although it is sensible to distinguish direct from indirect 
restraints on alienation, prevalent terminology has produced 
some analytical confusion: Since the Rule Against Perpetuities is 
usually designated as the rule against indirect restraints on alien-
ation, what do we call unlawful restraints on alienation that do 
not violate the Rule but that also do not purport explicitly to 
restrain alienation? The term "practical restraints"114 has been 
used, or "restraints in substance."115 Obviously not every contrac-
tual or dispositive provision that imposes some practical restraint 
on alienability is unlawful. Either by its nature, or because the 
benefit derived outweighs the practical harm, a practical re-
straint is unlawful only if the relevant circumstances reveal that 
it restrains alienability unreasonably. It follows that certain 
practical restraints, although not subject to the Rule Against Per-
petuities, may still be unreasonable by virtue of their duration. 
In other words, the Rule Against Perpetuities need not be the only 
rule limiting the duration of an indirect impediment to alienabil-
ity. This is the real meaning of the recent New York116 and New 
Jersey117 developments concerning the duration of affirmative 
covenants. 
This is not the place for a. general exploration of the vague 
dimensions or the underlying meaning of any policy or doctrine 
governing restraints on alienation. At the least, it seems clear 
that the courts have always been willing to consider carefully 
whether certain arrangements affecting property constitute 
undue practical restraints upon alienation or offend some other 
identifiable public policy.118 It is also now evident that the courts 
deem that question relevant to the problem of running covenants 
and that the main impediment to our understanding that prob-
lem has been the masquerading of public policy in forms that 
114. Berg, supra note 105, at 10 (emphasis omitted). 
115. 6 AMErucAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 26.63-.80 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). 
116. See text at note 75 supra. 
117. See text at note 81 supra. 
118. Courts frequently declare in effect that covenants affecting land use are valid if 
they do not violate public policy. See, e.g., Lake View Memorial Hosp. v. County of 
Vermilion, 23 Ill. App. 3d 413, 419, 318 N.E.2d 752, 756 (1974); Le Vielle v. Seay, 412 
S.W.2d 587, 593 (Ky. 1967); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 492, 
500, 306 N.E.2d 257, 263 (1974) (quoting statute); Boiling Spring Lakes Div. of Reeves 
Telecom Corp. v. Coastal Serv. Corp., 27 N.C. App. 191, 218 S.E.2d 476, 478 (1975); Loeb 
v. Watkins, 428 Pa. 480, 484, 240 A.2d 513, 516 (1968); Vickery v. Powell, 267 S.C. 23, 28, 
225 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1976). 
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either hide their policy basis or distract attention from it. 
A search for policy limitations on the running of covenants 
is bound to concentrate on the running of affirmative burdens. It 
will also embrace whatever policy is found to support the old 
touching and concerning doctrine. If one rejects the English con-
demnation of the running of all affirmative burdens, the fact 
remains that most affirmative burdens are more burdensome 
than most restrictive ones. 119 That a variety of covenants restrict 
a subdivision in order to preserve a residential neighborhood may 
often not seem a burden at all. On the other hand, obligations to 
perform certain acts, including the payment of money, may be 
felt as physically or financially objectionable. Affirmative bur-
dens, however, do not necessarily impose more objectionable fet-
ters on alienability than restrictive ones, though they have pecu-
liar intricacies not yet fully fathomed in policy terms nor carefully 
differentiated for policy purposes. 
Consider first the most common and simple type of covenant, 
like that in Neponsit, 120 to pay for the maintenance of facilities 
that benefit subdivision lot owners. Covenants to pay money have 
always been suspect under the touching and concerning require-
ment, especially in the landlord-tenant relation, despite the fact 
that a covenant to pay rent has always run with a leasehold, 
estate. Similarly, subdivision assessments are now generally con-
ceded to touch and concern the promisor's lot, for the benefit 
acquired with the payments clearly enhances the enjoyment and 
value of his land and often relieves the promisor from maintain-
ing his own property in certain ways. The question has seldom 
arisen whether the benefit of his promise concerns land of the 
promisee. The promisee or the beneficiary of the promise will 
likely be a corporation organized to manage the provision of ser-
vices. As in Neponsit, one can consider the corporate enforcement 
agency merely a representative of the lot owners themselves or an 
intermediary between one lot owner and all others, so that in 
substance the benefit of the covenant touches and concerns the 
land of all other lot owners. In this case, it hardly seems necessary 
that the intermediate agency, corporate or otherwise, own land 
119. In Lloyd, Enforcement of Affirmative Agreements Respecting the Use of Land, 
14 VA. L. REv. 419, 431 (1928), the author concludes with this statement: 
But such agreements if a perpetual clog on the title are more conspicuously objec-
tionable than those purely restrictive and call even more for a fixed limit to their, 
duration. So limited, affirmative restrictions would seem to differ from negative in 
social advantage and disadvantage less in kind than in degree. 
120. Neponsit Property Owners' Assn. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 
16 N.E.2d 793 (1938), discussed in text at note 74 supra. 
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within the subdivision with which the benefit of the covenant will 
run. 
Public policy in this situation concerns either the covenant's 
duration or its vagueness. Does the equitable defense of changed 
conditions resolve the duration problem? Although available to 
an original purchaser-promisor, this defense obviously affects the 
running of a covenant as well. Is it a rule of policy? Courts never 
speak of it as such; they merely say that a covenant can no longer 
be enforced when circumstances frustrate the purposes of the 
restriction.121 At most, courts label enforcement in such circum-
stances inequitable. One might infer, as a rule of construction, 
that the parties intended the obligation to continue only so long 
as its evident purpose could be achieved. In any case, the rule can 
be justified as one of policy, so that upon changes of certain 
conditions, the obligation may become an unreasonable burden 
on land use, and in fact an unreasonable restraint on alienation. 
In policy terms, no reason exists to limit that rule to the 
traditional kinds of changed conditions that courts have invoked 
as a defense to the enforcement of equitable servitudes. It ought 
to apply, for example, to cases not involving the complexities of 
a subdivision scheme. Indeed there is no limit to the kinds of 
conceivable circumstances relevant to this problem. Similarly, 
although the defense of changed conditions is usually raised re-
specting restrictive covenants, l see no reason against applying it 
to affirmative burdens also. If changed conditions invalidated 
subdivision restrictions, however, it does not necessarily follow 
that affirmative promises respecting subdivision services also 
become unenforceable, for the two are not necessarily related. 
Confining the changed conditions rule to equitable proceed-
ings creates an anomaly if, without regard to changed conditions, 
a covenant can be enforced at law and remain a cloud on title.122 
It is not unprecedented to extend equitable defenses to actions at 
law. In any event, the termination of a covenant under proper 
changed conditions can be declared a requirement of public pol-
icy both at law and in equity. In other words, where the defense 
of changed conditions, on the basis of precedent, is not applica-
ble, it would remain open to a court, in respect to restrictive as 
well as affirmative covenants, and both at law and in equity, to 
declare that the burden of a convenant is extinguished where 
under particular circumstances it has become unreasonable. 
121. 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.39 at 446 (A.J. Casner ed. 1962). 
122. Id. 
November 1978] Running Covenants 39 
As previously mentioned, public policy in the subdivision 
situation also questions the vagueness of a promise concerning 
subdivision management, as in Beekmere. 123 Construction may 
solve this problem; courts can· infer that the amount of an assess-
ment and the use of acquired funds are limited to providing 
proper maintenance or recognized · services. Where that cannot 
be implied, the covenant's vagueness may indeed unreasonably 
fetter alienability, and so not run with. the· units of land even 
where contract principles would not void the covenant on that 
ground as between the original parties. 
Consider a variant of the typical subdivision-assessment cov-
enant: a covenant to furnish a service or other benefit to the land 
of the promisee. This is the Nicholson12' type of case. The promi-
sor in that case convenanted to supply heat from his building to 
the promisee's building. Both the burden and the benefit of the 
promise clearly touched and concerned the land of the respective 
parties. The Nicholson court resolved the most obvious policy 
problem, the obligation's duration, by recognizing an inherent 
time limitation: the life of the two buildings. It may seem prefera-
ble to handle the problem as suggested above in regard to the 
changed-conditions rule. 1211 In any event, courts should not void 
the covenant solely because it may last too long. The covenant 
should be valid unless and until changed conditions render it an 
unreasonable restraint on the alienation of the burdened land. 
It may merely be borrowing trouble to mention certain un-
likely variants of this type of case, but one cannot shy from the 
margins of normal practices and expectations when testing the 
requirements of public policy. Landlords or tenants occasionally 
promise to pay the taxes on leased land or for utilities.128 Suppose 
instead that a grantee of land in fee simple promised to pay for 
improvements or taxes on land of the grantor or for the grantor's 
utilities. The benefit of that promise touches and concerns the 
grantor's land, but by traditional standards the burden is in 
gross. Can the parties nevertheless bind the successors of the 
promisor by an explicit provision in the deed? This raises a funda-
mental question about the policy basis of the touching and con-
cerning requirement: Is that requirement more than a rule of 
123. Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 117 N.J. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911 (Ch. Div. 1971), 
discussed in text at note 81 supra. 
124. Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 240, 164 N.E.2d 832 (1959), 
discussed in text at note 75 supra. 
125. See text at note 121 supra. 
126. 2 AMErucAN LAw OF PRoPERl'Y § 9.4 at 347 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). 
40 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:12 
construction, that is, a means of inferring the intention of the 
parties? The parties can clearly make the burden of a simple 
promise to pay money a lien upon the promisor's land. Even the 
English rule against the running of all affirmative burdens does 
not reach cases involving rent-charges or perhaps even liens. If 
the promise is to make a lump-sum payment for all or part of 
some improvement to the land of the promisee, the analogy to a 
mortgage seems obvious, except that a mortgage lien binds the 
land of the mortgagee without imposing a running personal obli-
gation. Where the parties clearly intended to bind the promisor's 
successors, however, courts have been known to construe such a 
promise as in effect the creation of a lien. Does the creation of a 
lien require explicit technical language? Even if it does, is the 
difference between an explicit lien and an explicit imposition on 
the promisor's successor of a promise to pay money really impor-
tant as a matter of public policy? The burden of a promise to pay 
a lump sum restrains alienation no more than a lien or a mort-
gage; it will simply be accounted for in fixing the purchase price 
of the burdened land. To this limited extent, at least, cannot the 
original parties, by their own fiat, make the burden of the promise 
touch and concern the land of the promisor?127 To reach such a 
conclusion it is not necessary to construe every promise to pay 
money as creating a lien binding the property itself rather than 
personally binding a successor. of the promisor. 
The duration of such a lump-sum promise presents no prob-
lem either. Normally the parties will contemplate that the im-
provement to be paid for will be made within a reasonable time. 
Even if they do not, the continuing burden will simply reduce the 
value of the promisor's land by a calculable amount that can be 
reflected in a later sale. If, however, the parties leave the extent 
of the improvement, and so the burden of the obligation to pay 
for it, so indefinite as not to be calculable within reasonable lim-
its, it may then indeed become an unreasonable fetter on aliena-
bility. As in the cases mentioned above that involved vague prop-
erty assessments, 128 the burden should not run. 
Suppose, however, that the promise cannot be discharged 
with a lump-sum payment. For instance, a covenant to maintain 
or repair a fence, bridge, or other structure requires the promisor 
127. Cf. Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MtNN, 
L. R.Ev. 167, 231 (1970) (purchaser seeing promise to pay for existing improvements in prior 
deed of land ought to realize that promise bound predecessor as owner of the land and 
burden ought to run). 
128. See text at note 81 supra. 
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to pay recurrent charges. By analogy to the above analysis con-
cerning liens and mortgages, a recurrent obligation between own-
ers in fee simple amounts to something like a "ground rent" or a 
"quit rent." Ground rents are not generally recognized in this 
country,129 however, because history and the doctrine of estates 
deny that owners in fee simple share the tenure relationship req-
uisite to charging rent. But is so conceptual a response really a 
persuasive policy argument against the running of this type of 
promise? Arguably it is not, since the reasonableness of the re-
straint on alienation turns on the particular circumstances of the 
case. In-any case, we may argue that the touching and concerning 
requirement is not an invariable rule of public policy. Even where 
it is not satisfied in the traditional sense, as in this example .where 
the burden is in gross, the running of a burden should be denied 
only if that will unreasonably restrain alienation. 
As in Eagle Enterprises, 130 two kinds of affirmative covenants 
can be combined. The grantor, his grantee, or one of two neigh-
boring landowners, could promise either to furnish a service or 
other benefit, or to accept and pay for the services of the other. 
The considerations discussed above as to either kind of promise 
separately seem applicable. 
Consider now the least plausible kind of case in order to test 
further the touching and concerning requirement as a rule of 
policy. Suppose an eccentric grantor wishes to induce certain 
conduct by his grantee and his successors that has nothing to do 
with any land. His attempt to bind successors to a covenant 
requiring that conduct would very likely impose a severe restraint 
on alienation; if so, the covenant should be void whether the 
conduct is affirmative or restrictive. In fact, I cannot now think 
of a restrictive covenant that would not be void if it fails to satisfy 
a reasonable application of the touching and concerning require-
ment. Clearly, therefore, the touching and concerning require-
ment, when applied to restrictive covenants and to affirmative 
covenants not requiring the payment of money, does contain a 
policy ingredient. 
Conceding that public policy supports the touching and con-
cerning requirement to a considerable extent is no excuse for 
taking a narrow view of that requirement. No reason exists for 
applying a more restrictive standard than that declared by Judge 
129. See 2 AMEruCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.41 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). 
130. Eagle Enterprises v. Gross, 39 N.Y.2d 505, 349 N.E.2d 816 (1976), discussed in 
text at note 77 supra. 
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Clark131 in terms of the ordinary layman's expectation and as-
sumptions. The main issue in this regard relates to covenants 
that affect land economically but not physically, most obviously 
covenants governing business competition. The view that cove-
nants must physically touch and concern the land can be sup-
ported only by the notion that running burdens inherently preju-
dice the public interest and so must be kept within the narrowest 
possible bounds. Assuming that competition covenants do not 
violate the policy against restraints on trade, the current trend of 
the cases132 no longer supports the narrow view of such cove-
nants133 first declared in Massachusetts134 and supported by the 
Restatement. 135 Even Massachusetts has now questioned that 
view in principle. 138 
Apart from the competition problem, suppose a promise does 
in fact touch and concern the land of the promisor but the benefit 
is in gross. That burden will clearly not run in equity in Eng-
land, 137 and substantial but divided authority to the same effect 
exists in this country .138 At least in the Restatement's view, 139 that 
rule is one of public policy, based on the assumption mentioned 
above that all land-use restrictions are objectionable and can be 
justified only if a benefit to the land of either the promisor or the 
promisee accompanies the burden. But no one requires such a 
131. C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 99. Judge Clark's statement was made in reference 
to covenants between landlord and tenant. There is no reason to believe that he intended 
anything different for covenants between owners in fee simple. 
132. Doo v. Packwood, 265 Cal. App. 2d 752, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1968); Hall v. Ameri-
can Oil Co., 504 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. App. 1973); Alexander's Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Arnold 
Constable Corp., 105 N.J. Super. 14, 260 A.2d 792 (Ch. Div. 1969); Quadro Stations, Inc. 
v. Gilley, 7 N.C. App. 237, 172 S.E.2d 237 (1970); Gillen-Crow Pharmacies, Inc. v. Mand-
zak, 5 Ohio St. 2d 201, 215 N.E.2d 377 (1966). Contra, Savings, Inc. v. City ofBlytheville, 
240 Ark. 558, 401 S.W.2d 26 (1966) (also found covenant not intended to run); Clear Lake 
City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utile. Co., 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1977). 
133. 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.13, n.35 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). 
134. Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885). 
135. REsTATEMENT OF PRoPERTY § 537, Comment f (1944), takes the position that the 
benefit of such a promise will run, but that the burden will not, under the proposition 
that a burden will not run where the benefit does not physically touch and concern land. 
136. Shell Oil Co. v. Henry Ouellette & Sons Co., 352 Mass. 725, 227 N.E.2d 509 
(1967); cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 492, 306 N.E.2d 257 (1974), 
where Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885), was distinguished on the 
ground that here the purpose of the covenant was not to limit competition but to assure 
the orderly and mutually beneficial development of the area. 
137. London County Council v. Allen, [1914) 3 K.B. 642. 
138. 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY§ 9.32, nn.5-7 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). 
139. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 (1944). This section applies only to the running 
of burdens at law. Apparently the rule does not apply to the running of burdens in equity. 
Id. § 539, Comment k. As in the case of horizontal privity, one may wonder about the force 
of a rule of policy that applies at law but not in equity. 
November 1978) Running Covenants 43 
justification of easements in gross.140 In any event, the rule is 
quite mechanical since no effort is prescribed to weigh benefits 
in relation to burdens, which vary greatly in their weight or de-
gree. It may seem preferable to defeat the running of burdens 
where the benefit is in gross only if in all the circumstances the 
covenant unreasonably restrains alienation. 
Why cannot a grantor convey land with a restrictive promise 
that the land be used only for a wildlife sanctuary or some other 
environmentally beneficial purpose? If this can be done by a con-
dition or limitation, breach of which may produce forfeiture, why 
cannot it also be done by a covenant? Granted that the benefit 
probably is in gross and that the restriction obviously fetters 
alienation, if such a restriction on land use nonetheless serves 
the public interest, no reason exists why it should be held an un-
reasonable restraint on alienation. As a practical matter there 
are of course better ways of obtaining such an objective than by 
the use of conditions, limitations, or covenants. 
The rule against the running of burdens where the benefit is 
in gross has usually been applied to restrictive covenants. Affirm-
ative burdens of this sort are certainly not common, but the kind 
of case mentioned in the preceding paragraph could involve af-
firmative promises in support of the environmentally beneficial 
purposes. If so, the same analysis should produce the same result. 
The duration of such an arrangement, whether affirmative 
or negative, seems not to raise problems except as changed con-
ditions may render the burden no longer reasonable. However, 
one other aspect of the problem of the running of burdens with 
benefits in gross is more troublesome. In Atchison v. City of 
Englewood, 141 the court decided that a pre-emptive option to pur-
chase land (a right of first refusal) held by a married couple and 
their successors, and unlimited in time, violated the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. A majority of the courts that have ruled on the 
question support that result with the technical analysis that an 
option creates a contingent future interest in land. 142 The court 
in Atchison, however, gave a special reason for its decision. Such 
an option, unlike an option appendant to property of the op-
tionee, would seriously impair the alienability of the land subject 
to the option, for the owner of that land might have considerable 
difficulty tracing the ownership of the option and the location of 
140. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 454, 490-91 (1944). The latter two sections deal 
with the alienability of easements in gross. 
141. 170 Colo. 295, 463 P.2d 297 (1969). 
142. See Browder, supra note !12, at 248. 
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successive owners. The same sort of argument has been made 
against the assignment of easements in gross. This difficulty ex-
ists to some degree with the alienability of rights of entry and of 
possibilities of reverter, but has never bothered the courts. 
I know of no other case in which the court analyzed an option 
in gross in that manner. However sound the decision may be 
respecting options, it does not seem applicable to the usual cove-
nants respecting land use, which will rarely be framed so as to be 
subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. The real problem of 
course is whether a covenant constitutes an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation. The Atchison court conceded that, but ap-
plied the Rule Against Perpetuities nevertheless because that 
seemed the only way to control the duration of an option. But the 
doctrine of changed conditions and a decree terminating the cove-
nant can control the duration of covenants respecting land use. 
Surely established procedures exist for raising that question even 
if the identity or location of the promisee is unknown. The diffi-
culty in finding the promisee seems to impede alienability on this 
score only where a successor to the promisor wishes to negotiate 
a release. It is at least arguable that that difficulty alone does not 
make the running of the burden of a covenant where the benefit 
is in gross an unreasonable restraint on alienation. 
lN CONCLUSION 
Property lawYers and teachers are accustomed to jibes from 
their colleagues about how outworn relics of the past still govern 
the law of property. In fact, when dealing with property problems 
the courts as well as legislatures are generally proving themselves 
to be as responsive to current needs and are keeping that law as 
"relevant" as in any other field. But otherwise discredited epi-
thets still have some justification in the law on covenants running 
with the land. One of my purposes in this Article was to empha-
size in some detail why and to what extent this is so. 
Modern English courts did adapt or avoid old notions to 
fashion a simple though highly restrictive doctrine on running 
covenants; but that doctrine is not a relic of the past, unless in 
the light of currently developing English conditions a nineteenth-
century doctrine can be so described. However, little explanation 
has ever appeared for making that doctrine so restrictive. 
As the need to develop an American doctrine emerged in the 
nineteenth century, the American courts were understandably 
confused about what the old law really required, as well as about 
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what the English courts were really doing in concurrently evolv-
ing the doctrine of equitable servitudes. As a result, a horizontal 
privity of estates requirerµent that bears little resemblance to 
anything in England has survived and evolved. The only sensible 
thing that can be said for it is that it represented an effort to 
liberalize an English rule felt to be too harsh for American condi-
tions. 
The oldest relic of all is the touching and concerning require-
ment. It is now seen to be more than a relic, to have current 
vitality and relevance, but where courts have only vague, un-
stated feelings or fears that running covenants may off end public 
policy, they may impose the requirement with too restrictive a 
meaning. 
Most current cases in the field escape these problems. They 
usually determine whether a purchaser of burdened land pur-
chased with or without notice of the burden in light of the Ameri-
can recording system; or they question who can enforce' a sub-
division restriction among a number of neighbors who may or 
may not be similarly situated. The latter problem has its own 
special intricacies but it would extend this Article unduly to 
pursue them. I have the impression that for the most part courts 
handle these questions satisfactorily and without dogmatic im-
pediments. Apart from these matters courts continue to stumble 
over privity or other too restrictive notions. 
In my effort to seek solid public policy bases for any restric-
tions upon running covenants, I have refused to assume or assert 
that there are none. One can never predict all the kinds of cove-
nants people may want to make that seem to offend the public 
interest, although the most obvious and likely offense is the run-
ning of a covenant in circumstances that violate the policy 
against restraints on alienation. Unfortunately, the essence of 
that policy and the conditions to which it is relevant remain 
undefined when invoked in this and other fields. The duration of 
a covenant, especially of one imposing an affirmative burden, 
presents the most likely source of contention. I have suggested the 
desirability of reserving a judgment against validity on this 
ground until circumstances reveal that the covenant has become 
unreasonable. There is no place in that judgment to declare by 
analogy to perpetuities that a covenant is void because it may last 
too long. 
The touching and concerning requirement can continue to 
serve best as a rule of construction on the question of parties' 
intent that a covenant run. Cases will occasionally appear where 
the parties' expressly declared intention that the covenant run is 
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defeated because the covenant's failure to concern land leaves it 
to operate as an unreasonable fetter on alienation. Some further 
thought may be desirable, for instance, on the peculiar nature of 
affirmative covenants to pay money, but I have suggested that 
here the touching and concerning requirement may disappear as 
a rule of policy, for the original parties may be taken to have tied 
the covenant to land by their own expression of intent. 
Finally, the American recording statutes should be clarified 
or modified by construction or amendment where necessary to 
provide that any properly executed promise that either benefits 
or burdens land shall be recordable and consequently affect the 
law regarding notice and bona fide purchase. 
My main plea is that courts face the policy question head-
on. They have not been embarrassed or reluctant to do so in other 
areas when the question is presented openly and directly. The 
question will be presented in that manner if the courts free them-
selves from rules or attitudes that exemplify vague notions of 
public policy in disguise. 
A law review note written forty years ago primarily about the 
running of affirmative burdens ends by proposing that until the 
effects of affirmative covenants upon alienability are empirically 
analyzed, the "controlling considerations should be the doctrines 
of intent and notice," presumably with respect to both affirma-
tive and restrictive covenants.143 My view is not far from this. No 
factual analyses regarding alienability have been forthcoming, 
however, nor can they be expected in view of the nature and 
variety of alienability problems. In their absence, courts must 
deal with the policies concerning alienability as they have in 
other areas-on the basis of unproved inferences and assess-
ments. This problem does not yet permit the enumeration of any 
organized, specific doctrine. Courts may well proceed primarily 
with the doctrine of intent and notice, provided they remain alert 
to perceive the effects of running covenants upon the alienability 
of land. I have sought here to offer assessments of several existing 
or anticipated problems in that regard. 
143. Note, 47 YALE L. J. 821, 827 (1938). 
